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Abstract: Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security based on
the laws of quantum mechanics. The desire to reduce costs and increase robustness in real-
world applications has motivated the study of coexistence between QKD and intense classical
data traffic in a single fiber. Previous works on coexistence in metropolitan areas have used
wavelength-division multiplexing, however, coexistence in backbone fiber networks remains a
great experimental challenge, as Tbps data of up to 20 dBm optical power is transferred, and much
more noise is generated for QKD. Here we present for the first time, to the best of our knowledge,
the integration of QKD with a commercial backbone network of 3.6 Tbps classical data at 21
dBm launch power over 66 km fiber. With 20 GHz pass-band filtering and large effective core
area fibers, real-time secure key rates can reach 4.5 kbps and 5.1 kbps for co-propagation and
counter-propagation at the maximum launch power, respectively. This demonstrates feasibility
and represents an important step towards building a quantum network that coexists with the
current backbone fiber infrastructure of classical communications.
© 2018 Optical Society of America under the terms of the OSA Open Access Publishing Agreement
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1], based on the laws of quantum physics, provides proven
unconditional security for data communication between remote users. Since its introduction
in 1984 [2], experimental efforts have been made to achieve long distance and high key rate
in optical fibers, such as the recent record demonstration of 404 km [3] and Mbits per second
(Mbps) secure key generation [4]. So far, QKD has become one of the most mature and advanced
quantum information technologies ready for use. To demonstrate its reliability and robustness over
long periods of time, field experiments of QKD based secure communications for metropolitan
networks and intercity links have been performed [5–13].
However, in order to protect ultra-weak QKD signals, all of the above achievements were
performed in dark fibers with a wavelength set around 1550 nm. This implies dedicated fiber
installations for quantum communication networks, which bears cost penalties in fiber leasing and
maintenance, as well as limitations on the network scale. In fact, to reduce cost and increase fiber
transmission efficiency, classical communications (CC) have already exploited methods such
as time-division multiplexing (TDM) and wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) to achieve
data throughput of up to Terabits per second (Tbps) and ultra-long transmission distances [14].
Therefore, it is highly desired to integrate QKD with CC in existing fiber infrastructures and to
expand the scalability of QKD networks.
The scheme of simultaneously transmitting QKD with conventional data was first introduced
by Townsend in 1997 [15]. Using coarse wavelength-division multiplexing (CWDM), a QKD
channel at 1300 nm was multiplexed with a conventional 1.2 Gbps data channel at 1550 nm over
28 km installed fiber. Although no privacy amplification or yield of secret key was reported [15],
it provided a blueprint for the coexistence works that followed. A series of QKD experiments
integrating with various classical channels have been demonstrated [4, 16–24], and perspectives
on the obstacles and approaches to share existing fiber infrastructures among quantum and
classical channels have been discussed [25–28].
Currently, by using spectral and temporal controls, state-of-the-art developments have been
made to realize co-propagation of QKD with one 100 Gbps dense wavelength-division multi-
plexing (DWDM) data channel in 150 km ultra-low loss fiber at −5 dBm launch power [29].
By setting QKD wavelength to 1310 nm and inserting DWDM filters with bandwidth of 100
GHz before QKD receivers to improve out-of-band noise rejection, co-propagation of QKD with
classical traffic was recently demonstrated over 80 km fiber spools [30]. In that experiment, by
assembling the CC system with high-performance affiliated equipment in the laboratory, data
transmission at Tbps level was achieved at 11 dBm launch power. A field trial of simultaneous
QKD transmission and four 10 Gbps encrypted data channels was implemented over 26 km
installed fiber at −10 dBm launch power [31].
However, the integration of QKD with existing backbone network is different from the previous
implementations. On the one hand, backbone networks use complex classical communication
systems with extremely high-level stability, reliability, and redundancy. Therefore, in realistic
backbone networks, launch power for Tbps level classical data reaches ∼ 20 dBm, which results
in significantly stronger Raman scattering to QKD than in Ref. [30]. Using the previous 100 GHz
pass-band filtering, key generationwill be difficult, and coexistencemay not be achieved in realistic
backbone networks. On the other hand, such field integration may suffer from environmental
factors and social activities that are not encountered in laboratory demonstrations. To close the
gap between laboratory demonstrations and practical applications, there are many great technical
challenges to overcome for the integration of QKD with backbone fiber infrastructures.
In this work, we present for the first time, to the best of our knowledge, the coexistence of
QKD and commercial backbone network of 3.6 Tbps classical data over 66 km fiber at the
maximum launch power, i.e., 21 dBm. With a 20 GHz pass-band filter, we achieve co-propagation
of QKD and 21 dBm classical data over standard single-mode fiber with 3.0 kbps secure key
rate and 2.5% quantum bit error rate (QBER). Using low-loss fiber with large effective core
area, secure key rates can be further increased to 4.5 kbps and 5.1 kbps for co-propagation and
counter-propagation, respectively. Contributions of filter bandwidth, fiber loss, and fiber effective
core area to the quantum signal-to-noise ratio (QSNR) and secure key rate are modeled and
analyzed. The QKD stability and the coexistence effects on CC are also investigated.
2. Experiment
The field experiment is performed over a backbone loop network with a total installed fiber
distance of 800 km and eight nodes spanning across Shandong province, China, deployed by
China United Telecom (China Unicom), as shown in Fig. 1a. Considering fiber loss between
the nodes and QKD system performance, we assign Alice to node Zhucheng (119◦24′43′′ N
36◦3′00′′ E) and Bob to node Huangshan (119◦59′50′′ N, 36◦2′4′′ E), which has in-between 66
km installed fiber deployed along highways, bridges, and tunnels. Meanwhile, the transmitter
and receiver of CC are placed in the Jinan laboratory for performance analysis, while optical
amplifiers (OA) are located in other stations, controlled by internet monitors for optical gain
adjustments. We verify the performances of both QKD system and CC system on three types
of fibers with different effective core areas (whereas the fibers connecting other nodes are all
G654 fibers with an effective core area of 110 µm2), whose specifications are listed in Table 1,
with fiber links G652-1, G654-110-1, G654-130-1 for co-propagation and fiber links G652-2,
G654-110-2, G654-130-2 for counter-propagation. All fibers on the backbone network follow
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Fig. 1. a) Field configurations of the experiment. The single yellow line represents the
deployed two fiber links between communication stations. b) Spectrum of the CC measured
at Zhucheng. The 200 Gbps channels are shown as the root-raised cosine waveforms, while
the 100 Gbps channels are shown as the Gaussian waveforms. c) Coexistence schematics of
the experiment. The wavelengths of QKD, sync, and data signals are 1310 nm, 1490 nm,
1528 ∼ 1538 nm, respectively.
the International Telecommunication Union standards. Since these G654 fibers possess larger
effective core areas than the standard single-mode fiber, it can be used to lower optical effects at
the fundamental light-matter interaction level in coexistence experiments and thus to enhance
QKD performances.
Table 1. Field fibers specifications
Fiber type Att (dB/km) Total loss (dB) Aeff1550nm 1310nm 1550nm 1310nm µm2
G652-1 0.197 0.337 13.01 22.21 80
G652-2 0.196 0.338 12.94 22.29 80
G654-110-1 0.184 0.300 12.13 19.83 110
G654-110-2 0.174 0.288 11.51 19.03 110
G654-130-1 0.210 0.347 13.84 22.88 130
G654-130-2 0.208 0.348 13.73 22.95 130
For classical data traffic, we adopt a commercial hybrid system from China Unicom (Alcatel-
Lucent 1830PSS-64) with aggregate transmission rate of 3.6 Tbps, which is achieved by four line
cards with 50 GHz bandwidth and four line cards with 62.5 GHz bandwidth. In each line card,
the super-channel scheme is used, consisting of two sub-carriers that carry 200 Gbps polarization
division multiplexing with 8-quadrature amplitude modulation format. In addition, four 100 Gbps
line cards with quadrature phase shift keying modulation format are included in the CC system.
The CC spectrum is shown in Fig. 1b, including 20 channels covering about 1528 ∼ 1538 nm.
The total launch power can be tuned from 8 to 21 dBm, with optimal launch power is ∼ 18 dBm.
Utilizing pseudo-random binary sequence generated by a test instrument to serve as the classical
data throughout the experiment and varying the launch power, the parameters of Q-factor and
OSNR are measured. When the launch power is reduced down to a low level, e.g., 11 dBm as
in [30], the bit error rate (BER) is close to the bound for forward error correction, which results
in the failure of the data transmission of CC.
For QKD, we develop a polarization encoding, decoy-state BB84 protocol-based system. Signal
pulses at 1310 nm are prepared at Alice's site with a repetition rate of 625 MHz. The pulse train
is internally modulated to 70 ps width and further shaped to 1310± 0.036 nm at full width at half
maximum (FWHM) with a 10 GHz fiber Bragg grating (FBG), which is used to compensate
dispersion effects and to guarantee pulse registration within the detector effective gating width.
The mean photon numbers of the signal state µ, decoy state ν, and vacuum state ω are 0.6, 0.2,
0 [32], respectively, with an emission ratio of Pµ : Pν : Pω = 6 : 1 : 1, which are controlled by a
physical random number generator implemented in a field programmable gate array (FPGA).
Using two polarization beam splitters and a polarization controller, four nonorthogonal states are
generated with output powers adjusted to single-photon level using a variable optical attenuator.
The received photons at Bob's site are recorded by four InGaAs/InP single-photon detectors
(SPDs) [33,34], which operated at 1.25 GHz gating frequency with a detection efficiency of 11%
and a dark count rate per gate of 3 × 10−7 in average. The detector effective gating width is set
to ∼180 ps to provide temporal filtering while maintaining maximum detection efficiency, and
the detector dead time (tdead) is 1 µs. Automatic polarization feedback system is implemented
using two electric polarization controllers at Bob’s site to adjust the extinction ratio between the
orthogonal states [35]. Visibility reaches ∼ 21.5 dB after feedback control, corresponding to a
0.7% optical misalignment error rate (ed). Meanwhile, synchronized clock signal between Alice
and Bob (Sync) at 1490 nm propagates along QKD signals with a repetition rate of 100 kHz and
a received optical power of −53 dBm.
After the pulses are registered at Bob's detectors, a series of post-processing for real-time
secure key extraction is performed. First, the public discussion channel between Alice and Bob
is established through pre-stored QKD keys, which are periodically replaced with fresh keys.
The keys are fed into Toeplitz Hash algorithms using linear feedback shift register to implement
authentication [36]. Next, key sifting and basis sifting are executed, followed by error correction
(EC) using Winnow codes with a correction efficiency of 1.2∼1.5, and error verification (EV)
using CRC-64 algorithm. Afterwards, privacy amplification (PA) is performed to eliminate
information leakage to Eve during EC and EV. An estimated final key rate is calculated using
standard decoy-state method [37–40] to determine a PA factor, defined as the ratio of the estimated
final key rate to the corrected key rate after EV. With the PA factor, an exact Toeplitz matrix is
constructed to extract final secure keys from the corrected keys. Considering the real-time key
extraction period, the block size for parameter estimation is set to 500 kbits to guarantee the
freshness of final keys. Also, considering statistical fluctuations, 7 standard deviations are used to
guarantee the security of final keys. Further, by evaluating QBER using the decoy-state method,
a strict upper bound is set to 4% for redundancy control, which corresponds to a QSNR lower
bound of ∼11 dB, to guarantee stable key generation.
To achieve coexistence, WDM filters are applied, forming a multiplexing module (MUL) at
Alice and a de-multiplexing module (De-MUL) at Bob, see Fig. 1c. The insertion losses at 1550
nm and 1310 nm are respectively 0.86 dB and 0.30 dB for MUL, while 0.87 dB and 2.50 dB
for De-MUL. The isolation of 1310 nm from 1550 nm at MUL is 50 dB, while that of 1550 nm
from 1310 nm at De-MUL is 120 dB. Combining with a circulator, a temperature-compensated
FBG with a reflection band of 1310 ± 0.087 nm at FWHM forms a 20 GHz filter in De-MUL.
The crosstalk between QKD and CC channels is measured, with a noise level of ∼ 60 counts per
second (cps), which is much lower than the dark count rates of the SPDs and thus negligible in
the experiment.
When QKD is integrated with CC, the strong CC signals may cause severe impairments on
the weak QKD signals through fundamental light-matter interactions. Possible sources of noise
in the QKD wavelength from CC channels include four-wave mixing, Brillouin scattering, and
Raman scattering. By allocating the QKD wavelength to 1310 nm, a ∼ 200 nm gap is set between
the QKD and CC signals, so the noise photons caused by four-wave mixing in the QKD channel
is negligible. In addition, because of its low bandwidth (∼ 10 GHz), Brillouin scattering from the
CC channels do not affect QKD. In contrast, Raman scattering lead to large spectral shifts from
the CC channel wavelengths, with an intensity maximum at a shift of ∼ 13 THz and maximum
offset parameter to more than 50 THz [28]. Stimulated Raman scattering has a threshold of
∼ 600 mW for 20 km single-mode fiber at 50 µm2 effective core area [41], so considering the
fiber length and CC launch powers of our experiment, this effect from CC channels in the QKD
channel is negligible. Therefore, in this experiment, the photons generated by spontaneous Raman
scattering (SRS) from the CC channels is the only optical scattering noise in the QKD channel.
Furthermore, with the 20 GHz filter, SRS photons can be further reduced and hence the QSNR is
enhanced, which suggests the coexistence possibility with CC at the maximum launch power,
despite the fact that the 20 GHz filter has an insertion loss of 1.9 dB compared to that of 0.5 dB
for 100 GHz filter in Ref. [30].
3. Results and discussion
By adjusting the launch power of CC from 8 to 21 dBm, we measure the secure key rate and
QBER of QKD, as shown in Figs. 2a and b. For G652 fiber, 3.0 kbps secure key rate is achieved
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Fig. 2. Secure key rate (a) and QBER (b) of QKD as a function of CC optical power. Solid
squares: co-propagation; solid circles: counter-propagation.
at the maximum launch power for co-propagation. For counter-propagation, secure key rates
significantly drop given the launch power higher than 18 dBm. This is due to the fact that much
more SRS photons are created than in the case of co-propagation [16, 17, 26], corresponding to
a lower QSNR, given the same length of fiber and launch power. At 19 dBm, QBER reaches
4.0% and no secure keys are generated, as shown in Figs. 2a and b. These results indicate the
possibility of coexistence between QKD and classical backbone network in standard single-mode
fiber, both for co-propagation at the maximum launch power and for counter-propagation by
slightly decreasing the launch power.
The best QKD performance is achieved in G654-110 fiber. At the maximum launch power,
key rates reach 4.5 kbps and 5.1 kbps for co-propagation and counter-propagation, respectively.
The higher key rate in counter-propagation is due to the relatively lower fiber attenuation of
G654-110-2 fiber, see Table 1. For G654-130 fiber, the created SRS photons are much less
than that in G652 fiber, as shown in Fig. 3. However, due to the characteristic of higher fiber
attenuation, the key rate for co-propagation is lower than G652 fiber. For counter-propagation,
given a launch power larger than 13 dBm, contributions due to SRS in G652 fiber is much more
significant than fiber attenuations, which results in a lower QSNR than G654-130 fiber.
Further, we model the key rates using different fibers. Considering fiber attenuation and the
SRS of different effective core areas, the QSNR is defined as
QSNR = 10log10(
Nactual(1 − Pafter − ed)
NSRS + Ndark + Nafter
),
where Nactual is the actual QKD signal count rate, NSRS is the SRS photon count rate, Ndark is the
detector dark count rate, Pafter is the detector afterpulse probability (∼ 0.5% in our experiment),
and Nafter is the afterpulse count rate, calculated by Nafter = Nactual ·Pafter. Due to the detector dead
time, Nactual = Nµ/(1+ Nµ ·tdead4 ), where Nµ is the QKD signal count rate that would be obtained if
dead time was negligible. Nµ and NSRS are calculated, while Nactual, Ndark, and tdead are measured.
Table 2. Simulation results of QSNR and secure key rate in different cases. The attenuation
coefficients of standard fiber and low-loss fiber are 0.337 dB/km at 1310 nm and 0.197
dB/km at 1550 nm, and 0.288 dB/km at 1310 nm, 0.174 dB/km at 1550 nm, respectively.
Aeff (µm2) Co-propagation Counter-propagationQSNR (dB) Key rate (kbps) QSNR (dB) Key rate (kbps)
20 GHz filtering, low-loss fiber
80 50.5 5.5 18.3 3.2
110 65.8 5.9 29.5 4.9
130 71.1 6.0 34.5 5.2
20 GHz filtering, standard fiber
80 36 2.2 10.0 −
110 45.8 2.3 16.6 1.2
130 49.2 2.4 19.8 1.5
100 GHz filtering, low-loss fiber
80 14.0 1.8 2.8 −
110 23.5 3.6 5.8 −
130 28.1 4.1 7.5 −
100 GHz filtering, standard fiber
80 10.4 − 1.0 −
110 17.5 1.1 2.7 −
130 20.8 1.4 3.6 −
We then calculate NSRS, following the methods in Refs. [16, 17] to obtain the SRS coefficient
(β20GHz) of the three fibers. By averaging the results in Fig. 3 with different launch powers, for
both co-propagation and counter-propagation, we calculate the values of β20GHz as 18, 10, and 8
cps/dBm·km for G652, G654-110, and G654-130, respectively.
Following the above model, we evaluate the contributions of the major factors, i.e., filter
bandwidth, fiber attenuation, and fiber effective core area, to the key rate of QKD coexisting with
21 dBm launch power over 66 km transmission distance. The simulated results are shown in Table
2, from which one can find out three facts. First, narrow pass-band filtering in such coexistence
experiment is necessary. As shown in Table 2, using 100 GHz filtering, the QSNR values for
counter-propagation in three fibers are below 8 dB, without generating secure keys. In particular,
no keys are generated for both co-propagation and counter-propagation in standard fiber with 100
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Fig. 3. Photon count rate generated by SRS. By sending classical signals through the 66 km
field fiber along either the same direction of QKD signals (co-propagation, solid squares)
or the opposite direction (counter-propagation, solid circles), photons are recorded by the
SPDs. During this process, no QKD signals are transmitted. At each point, four SPD count
rates are averaged. For co-propagation and counter-propagation, G654-130 fiber exhibits the
lowest SRS photon count rates, with ∼ 60% reduction compared with the G652 fiber.
GHz filtering. This means QKD cannot be integrated with backbone network using the same
coexistence scheme of Ref. [30]. Second, using low-loss fiber, the QSNR is enhanced by 15.4 dB
in average, and the key rate can be increased twice at least. Third, since large effective core area
reduces the optical power density of the CC, the QSNR can be improved, which brings moderate
increase in key rate. By combining 20 GHz filtering, low-loss fiber with 130 µm2 effective core
area, the highest secure key rates of QKD for co-propagation and counter-propagation may reach
6.0 kbps and 5.2 kbps, respectively.
In the experiment, we have demonstrated integrating QKD with 3.6 Tbps classical data over
66 km installed fiber. Further results for longer transmission distances using G654-110-2 fiber at
the maximum launch power are simulated, as shown in Fig. 4. At 70 km and 80 km, secure key
rates are respectively 4.4 kbps and 1.9 kbps for co-propagation , and 4.0 kbps and 1.5 kbps for
counter-propagation. Even at 90 km, secure key rate may still reach 0.7 kbps for co-propagation.
This suggests that even integrating with CC at a typical span distance of 80 to 100 km secure key
rate of QKD is still sufficient for one-time pad voice and text encryptions. Using superconducting
nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) instead of InGaAs/InP SPDs used in the experiment,
the secure key rate can be substantially increased. We perform the theoretical calculations of
key rate for co-propagation and counter-propagation at 21 dBm launch power in G654-110-2
fiber, using the calibrated parameters of the SNSPDs in our laboratory [42], i.e., 45% detection
efficiency at 1310 nm and 30 cps dark count rate. The key rate is calculated following the
decoy-state approach in Ref. [39]. As shown in Fig. 4, when the SNSPDs are used, the key rates
for co-propagation and counter-propagation can be significantly increased to 32.7 kbps and 32.3
kbps at 66 km, respectively, while the maximum coexistence distances reach 145 km and 130 km
for co-propagation and counter-propagation, respectively.
We further investigate the stability of QKD coexisting with CC systems. Due to the limited
usage time in the backbone communication stations, we perform co-propagation measurement
in three fibers for 3 hours each, with ∼ 18 dBm launch power. The average key rates are 6.2
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Fig. 5. The stability test of secure key rate in three fibers.
kbps, 3.0 kbps, and 2.0 kbps for G654-110, G652, and G654-130 fibers, respectively, as shown
in Fig. 5. Despite the effects from social activities such as traffic, electricity, and constructions,
the stability test results indicate that our QKD systems can be reliably integrated with the CC
systems of backbone networks.
Finally, we measure the CC performance changes in the presence of QKD. The measured
results in G654-110 fiber are plotted in Figs. 6a and b, which show that the inclusion of QKD
brings negligible variations on OSNR of CC system. Nevertheless, due to insertion losses of
WDMmodules, CC launch power is lowered and the optical effects between adjacent CC channels
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Fig. 6. Q-factor (a) and OSNR (b) of CC system as the function of optical power in G654-110
fiber by applying 62.5 GHz and 50 GHz bandwidth carriers, respectively. G654-110: no
co-existence; G654-110-1: co-propagation; G654-110-2: counter-propagation.
during data transmission are reduced, which induces a slight increase of Q-factor, particularly
with launch powers higher than 16 dBm, as shown in Fig. 6a.
4. Conclusion
In summary, we have achieved for the first time, to the best of our knowledge, the coexistence of
QKD with a commercial backbone network of 3.6 Tbps classical data at the maximum launch
power over 66 km fiber. The key factors affecting the coexistence performance such as filter
bandwidth, fiber attenuation, and fiber effective core area are modeled and analyzed. Our work
validates the feasibility to build a quantum network coexisting with current backbone fiber
infrastructures of classical communications. Utilizing superconducting nanowire single-photon
detectors and increasing the repetition rate of the QKD system, the secure key rate and coexistence
distance can be further improved. Meanwhile, in the presence of untrusted network nodes and
detection attacks, measurement-device-independent QKD [13] provides an effective approach
and its coexistence with CC deserves future investigations. Using silicon photonics technologies,
low-cost, chip-based QKD devices [43] may be fully integrated inside CC modules, offering
wide accessibility and large-scale application.
In this work, the effects of transient problems caused by the dropping or adding data channels
are not included, and the spectral bandwidth of the classical channels does not cover all the
C+L-bands. Such interesting topics deserve future investigations.
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